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1 Introduction
In this paper, we analyze the interaction between optimal intergenerational
exchange under uncertainty (”risk sharing”) and capital accumulation in a
stochastic OLG model with production. Our contribution is twofold. First,
we characterize Pareto optimality with production. Second, we examine the
relation to dynamic efficiency and deal with observational implications of theo-
retical conditions of (sub-)optimality. As is well known, in pure exchange OLG
economies the first welfare theorem fails to hold, i.e., competitive equilibria
may fail to be Pareto optimal [Allais [1], Samuelson [21]]. A characterization
of Pareto optimality in a pure exchange OLG model under certainty was given
by Balasko and Shell [2] and and Okuno and Zilcha [18]. Under uncertainty, a
characterization of (interim) Pareto optimality in a pure exchange OLG model
was derived by Chattopadhyay and Gottardi [9].
Another strand of literature in capital theory with a long-standing tradition
is concerned with an a priori stronger form of inefficiency that is independent
of specific household preferences, namely the literature on the possibility of
capital overaccumulation (dynamic inefficiency) [see Bertocchi [3,4] for a good
discussion]. Of course, saving too much capital in a competitive equilibrium
in the sense that an alternative capital path can uniformly increase aggre-
gate consumption implies Pareto suboptimality. This literature was initiated
by Malinvaud [17] and then extended to growth models by Phelps [20] and
Diamond [13] and more general infinite-horizon production problems by Cass
[7]. 1 An extension of the dynamic efficiency issue under certainty to a setting
1 Tirole [22] analyzed the relationship between dynamic efficiency and the existence
of bubbles as well as the Pareto optimality of bubbly equilibria.
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with uncertainty has been given by Zilcha [23] and Dechert and Yamamoto
[10].
Characterizations in terms of prices in competitive equilibrium of these two
notions of efficiency - although the notions themselves are conceptually distinct
- are based on the same formal argument, so that the conditions in terms of
competitive equilibrium prices for dynamic inefficiency and Pareto optimality
in pure exchange models coincide under certainty [see Cass [7] and Okuno and
Zilcha [18] or Balasko and Shell [2]]. Under uncertainty, risk sharing issues
make important adaptations and qualifications necessary. Chattopadhyay and
Gottardi [9] extend and generalize a Cass-type argument to a stochastic pure
exchange model.
Our first contribution (Proposition 1) is a complete characterization of interim
Pareto optimality in a stochastic Diamond model, extending the proof by
Chattopadhyay and Gottardi [9] to a setup with production. 2 It turns out that
in a competitive equilibrium the characterization of interim Pareto optimality
is equivalent to the one in a pure exchange setup. This holds although in a
model with production there are more feasible deviations from the competitive
equilibrium than under pure exchange and it is not a priori possible to restrict
attention to pure transfer schemes.
As a special case of our optimality characterization we obtain Zilcha’s [23]
dynamic efficiency characterization (Proposition 2). Contrary to the case of
certainty, the conditions for dynamic efficiency and Pareto optimality do not
2 Demange and Laroque [12] derive a partial classification (but not a characteri-
zation) of interim Pareto optimality in a stochastic OLG model with production,
however under relatively strong stationarity assumptions.
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coincide under uncertainty. This means that the possibility of overaccumu-
lation of capital is not necessarily related to what Manuelli [15] called the
”intergenerational risk sharing” part of the efficiency problem. Nevertheless,
we show that there is a relationship between the risky rate of return on cap-
ital - and more generally the rate of return of some arbitrary asset - and
interim Pareto optimality of competitive equilibria (Proposition 3). Using this
relation, we derive a sufficient condition for interim Pareto optimality that
requires only the knowledge of the rates of return of some arbitrary asset for
each date-event and not the full set of contingent claims prices. This set of
results is related to recent independent research by Chattopadhyay [8] but is
more general [see the discussion after Proposition 4].
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the stochastic Diamond
model. Section 3 gives a complete characterization of interim Pareto optimality
in a competitive equilibrium. Section 4 reconsiders the condition for dynamic
efficiency and derives optimality tests based on risky and other rates of return.
All proofs are given in the appendix.
2 The Model
We consider a stochastic version of Diamond [13]. Uncertainty enters via
shocks to the production technology. Time is discrete, starts at 0 and extends
infinitely into the future. There is production and a consumption-savings de-
cision at every point of time.
Production The production technology at time t is described by a neoclassi-
cal constant-returns-to-scale production function F : R2+ × St → R+, where
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F (Kt, Lt, θt) is the output produced at time t, Kt is the capital stock, Lt is
the labor input and θt is the current stochastic shock. The perishable good
produced by the technology is the only good in the economy and is used for
production and consumption. For simplicity, the depreciation rate is assumed
to be 1. For convenience we work with the per-capita production function
f (kt, θt) = F
(
Kt
Lt
, 1, θt
)
(where k = K/L) with the following standard prop-
erties: f(0, θt) = 0, f
′ = ∂f
∂k
> 0, f ′′ < 0, f ′ (0, θt) =∞, f ′ (∞, θt) = 0.
Uncertainty W.l.o.g, for all t ≥ 1, the set of production shocks, St = S,
has finite cardinality where |S| is the cardinality of S and S0 is single-valued.
There is a system of strictly positive transition probabilities qt+1 (θt+1|σ) that
are contained in a compact subset of the interior of the |S| − 1 dimensional
unit simplex (where σ := (θ0, θ1, θ2, ..., θt)).
Since the production shocks are the only source of uncertainty in the economy,
it is possible to describe the uncertainty by a date-event tree, where σ0 =
{θ0} is the root and σ = (θ0, θ1, θ2, ..., θt) is a generic node. If we want to
stress the date of a node we write σt. The set of nodes at time t is therefore
S0×S1×S2×...×St and denoted by Σt. The date-event tree is denoted by Γ and
in slight abuse of notation we will identify it with the set of its nodes ∪t≥0Σt.
Every node σ = (θ0, θ1, θ2, ..., θt) has a unique immediate predecessor, denoted
σ−1, which is equal to (θ0, θ1, θ2, ..., θt−1). σ− denotes the set of all predecessor
nodes of node σ. σ+ denotes the set of nodes which are immediate successors
of node σ, i.e. the set of all nodes for which σ is the immediate predecessor.
A path is a sequence of nodes {σt}t≥0 such that σt+1 ∈ σ+t . A generic path
will be denoted by σ∞ and can be identified with a unique sequence of shocks
(θ0, θ1, θ2, ...) from the set Σ := S0 × S1 × S2 × .... The t-th coordinate of the
path σ∞ is denoted by σ∞t . t (σ) denotes the point of time at which event
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σ ∈ Σt occurs. We also identify a date-event tree Γ with the paths that it
contains, i.e. we use the obvious isomorphism between Σ and Γ. Any subset Γ˜
of Γ is called a subtree if each σ ∈ Γ˜ has an immediate successor node σ̂ ∈ Γ˜
and there exists a unique σ˜0 ∈ Γ˜ such that each σ ∈ Γ˜, σ 6= σ˜0, is a successor
node of σ˜0. Furthermore, denote by Γ (σ˜) the (full) subtree of Γ that has σ˜ ∈ Γ
as its root and includes all successor nodes of σ˜.
Households For simplicity we assume that there is no population growth,
Lt = L = 1 for all t. At each node in the tree, one household is born who lives
for two periods. Hence households are distinguished according to the date and
the state of nature in which they are born.
Since time starts at t = 0, we have one initially old household (born in period
−1). This household has preferences that are strictly monotone in the single
consumption good in period 0. His consumption in period 0 is denoted by
co (σ0).
All other households face uncertainty during their second period of life due to
the production shocks. The consumption set of a household born in σ is R1+|S|+ .
His von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences are described by a function Eσ
u (c (σ)) :=
∑
θt+1∈S qt+1 (θt+1|σ) · u (cy (σ) , co ((σ, θt+1))) . Here we denote by
c (σ) =
(
cy (σ) , (co (σ′))σ′∈σ+
)
the consumption vector of household σ, cy (σ) is
his consumption in his youth, (co (σ′))σ′∈σ+ is his consumption in the different
states of nature in his old age. The (Bernoulli) function u : R2+ → R is twice
continuously differentiable (in the interior of its domain), strictly increasing
in each argument and with negative definite Hessian matrix.
In his youth, each household receives a wage income w (σ) from inelastically
supplying one unit of labor. Facing state contingent prices p (σ) and p (σ′), σ′ ∈
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σ+, the household’s problem is to maximize utility subject to his intertemporal
budget constraint:
max
(cy(σ),(co(σ′))σ′∈σ+)∈R
1+|S|
+
Eσ u (c (σ)) (1)
s.t. p (σ) · cy (σ) + ∑
σ′∈σ+
p (σ′) · co (σ′) = p (σ) · w (σ) .
Since only one individual is born per node, markets are complete once an
individual is born. With several (heterogeneous) households born per node,
we would simply introduce a complete set of Arrow securities explicitly.
Firm The firm’s problem is to decide after the shock realization at each node
σ how much capital to invest. This capital is then used to produce output at
the successor nodes of σ. The firm maximizes expected profits given Arrow
Debreu prices p (σ) . Let k (σ) be the firm’s investment in state σ. The firm’s
problem at a node σ at time t is: 3
max
k(σ)≥0
∑
σ′∈σ+
[p (σ′) · f (k (σ) , θt+1)]− p (σ) · k (σ) . (2)
Next, we define feasible allocations, the notion of optimality and a competitive
equilibrium. Our definition of Pareto optimality was introduced by Muench
[16] and Peled [19]. It is also used in Chattopadhyay and Gottardi [9]. House-
holds born in different date-events are considered as distinct households. Then,
3 Problem (2) describes the problem of finding the optimal capital-labor ratio.
The original problem of the firm is to choose optimal capital and labor. Since the
production function has constant returns to scale, in equilibrium only the optimal
capital-labor ratio is determined, the firm is indifferent about absolute quantities.
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the usual concept of Pareto optimality is applied to this set of households.
Following the terminology of Demange and Laroque [11] we call this interim
Pareto optimality. This feature of our model distinguishes our analysis e.g.
from Blanchard and Weil [5] or Gottardi and Kubler [14] who adopt ex ante
Pareto optimality as a welfare criterion. Together with the fact that markets
are complete once an individual is born we may conclude that sequentially
complete markets are an important maintained feature of our setup through-
out the paper.
Definition 1 Let the initial capital stock k−1 be given. A feasible allocation is
a tuple (c, k) = (co (σ0) ,
((
cy (σ) , (co (σ′))σ′∈σ+
))
σ∈Γ),
(
(k (σ))σ∈Γ , k−1
)
) such
that
(1) co (σ0) + c
y (σ0) + k (σ0) = f (k−1, θ0),
(2) For σ ∈ Γ : co (σ′) + cy (σ′) + k (σ′) = f (k (σ) , θ) ∀σ′ = (σ, θ) ∈ σ+.
Definition 2 A feasible allocation (c, k) is called interim Pareto optimal if
there exists no other feasible allocation
(
ĉ, k̂
)
such that ĉo (σ0) ≥ co (σ0) and
Eσu (ĉ (σ)) ≥ Eσu (c (σ)) for all σ ∈ Γ, with at least one strict inequality.
Definition 3 (c∗, k∗, p∗, w∗) is a competitive equilibrium if c∗ solves the house-
hold’s problem (1) for every household given competitive wages w∗ and prices
p∗, firms maximize profits given p∗, and (c∗, k∗) is a feasible allocation, i.e.,
markets clear.
Throughout the rest of the paper, we say that a competitive equilibrium (c, k)
or more generally an allocation (c, k) is interior if the capital stock k is uni-
formly bounded away from 0 (given the initial capital stock k−1).
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3 Interim Pareto Optimality
We start with the definition of a transfer pattern. Chattopadhyay and Gottardi
[9] introduced an equivalent concept in their important paper.
Definition 4 A transfer pattern λ is a function λ : Γ → [0, 1] with the fol-
lowing properties. Γ can be partitioned, Γ = Γ+
·⋃
Γ0
·⋃{σ0} with Γ+ 6= ∅, so that
the following holds:
(1) λ (σ0) = 1.
(2) σ ∈ Γ0 if and only if λ (σ) = 0 and σ ∈ Γ0 implies for all σ′ ∈ σ+ that
σ′ ∈ Γ0.
(3) If σ ∈ Γ+ then ∑σ′∈σ+ λ (σ′) = 1.
The definition says in detail that 1. Γ can be divided into three disjoint subsets,
one set of nodes Γ0 where no transfers are assigned (the value of λ is set to zero
at such nodes), one set of nodes Γ+ associated with positive transfers, and the
root σ0. As a convenient convention transfer weight one is assigned to the root.
2. If no transfers are assigned at one node then no transfers are assigned at all
successor nodes of this node. 3. Most importantly, once transfers are assigned
at one node σ then they are assigned at some direct successor node(s) σ′ ∈ σ+.
Furthermore, transfers are normalized so that their weights sum up to one.
Now we can state our characterization result. Note that under our assumptions
we can derive the well-known uniform Gaussian curvature conditions from
primitives and do not have to assume them (see the appendix).
Proposition 1 An interior competitive equilibrium allocation is not interim
Pareto optimal if and only if there exists a transfer pattern λ and a finite
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positive number B such that for every path σ∞ =(σ∞0 ,σ
∞
1 , ...) in the tree
∞∑
t=1
1
p (σ∞t )
t∏
s=1
λ (σ∞s ) ≤ B. (3)
Remark 1 This condition coincides with the conditions for interim Pareto
(sub-)optimality in a pure exchange stochastic OLG model derived by Chat-
topadhyay and Gottardi [9].
To prove that the condition in Proposition 1 is necessary for a Pareto improve-
ment, it does not suffice to consider pure transfers between different gener-
ations [as in Chattopadhyay and Gottardi [9]] that leave the capital stock
unaffected. An improving allocation may e.g. involve an increase in the capi-
tal stock combined with transfers from young to old at certain date-events. 4
Another possibility is that improvements start with a decrease in capital. 5
So under uncertainty, there are many possible changes in consumption and
investment and it is tedious to rule them out separately.
To circumvent the problem of ruling out every possible change in the con-
sumption and investment plan separately, our proof focuses on deriving an
expression formally equivalent to the non-vanishing Gaussian curvature con-
dition for pure consumption changes used by Chattopadhyay and Gottardi [9]
that holds for all possible joint deviations. This is accomplished by starting
4 Under certainty, such increases in the capital stock can be ruled out directly as
an additional possibility for improvements from first order conditions of households
and firms and convexity of preferences and technology. This is not the case under
uncertainty. Also, under certainty, by a similar argument, increases in young age
consumption can be easily ruled out.
5 This possibility arises as additional source of improvements in the certainty and
uncertainty case.
11
with the non-vanishing Gaussian curvature condition for pure consumption
changes and incorporating a quadratic estimate from a second order Tay-
lor approximation for the production changes as used in Zilcha [23] into this
equation. 6 The first order conditions of the firm relating state prices and the
marginal product of capital eliminates the linear capital term. The quadratic
terms in consumption and capital can be simplified to a single quadratic ex-
pression in joint consumption-investment changes. 7 The resulting expression
is formally equivalent to the one in Chattopadhyay and Gottardi [9] and their
generalized Cass type argument can be applied. 8 It results that the charac-
terization of interim Pareto optimality with production is the same as in the
pure exchange case.
4 Testability: Observable Implications of Optimality
The Rate of Return to Capital and Dynamic Efficiency We now ex-
amine how the accumulation of capital interacts with opportunities of inter-
generational risk sharing in a dynamic economy. Dynamic efficiency rules out
the overaccumulation of capital in the sense that a decrease in savings would
allow for a permanently higher aggregate consumption level [see Dechert and
Yamamoto [10] and Zilcha [23]. Zilcha [23] shows in his Lemma 1, p.373, that
this definition is equivalent to his original notion of dynamic efficiency given
on p. 369 of his paper.]
6 See equations (A.1) and (A.2) in the proof.
7 This is achieved by using an elementary inequality, see the paragraph preceding
equation (A.3).
8 See equation (A.5) in the proof.
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Definition 5 A sequence of investment decisions
(
k (σ)σ∈Γ
)
is dynamically
efficient if there exists no other sequence of investment decisions
(
k̂ (σ)σ∈Γ
)
such that (with at least one strict inequality):
∀σ ∈ Γ: f
(
k̂ (σ) , θ
)
− k̂ (σ′) ≥ f (k (σ) , θ)− k (σ′) ∀σ′ = (σ, θ) ∈ σ+
f (k−1, θ0)− k̂ (σ0) ≥ f (k−1, θ0)− k (σ0)
Let us introduce the risky rate of return r∗, which is defined as the marginal
product of capital, r∗ (σ∞s ) = f
′
(
k
(
σ∞s−1
)
, θ
)
, where
(
σ∞s−1, θ
)
= σ∞s .
For a given subtree Γ (σ˜) (that contains all successor nodes of σ˜), we define
the set of paths in Γ (σ˜) as the set of paths σ∞ with σ∞
t(σ˜)
= σ˜. The following
characterization of dynamic efficiency under uncertainty is - apart from a
technicality concerning the uniform bound - due to Zilcha [23]:
Proposition 2 A feasible allocation is dynamically inefficient if and only if
there exists a node σ˜ ∈ Γ and some C > 0 such that along every path σ∞ in
Γ (σ˜) we have
∞∑
t=1
t∏
s=1
r∗ (σ∞s ) ≤ C. (4)
By definition, interim Pareto optimality implies dynamic efficiency. In fact,
in a deterministic framework the two notions of efficiency coincide [see also
Bose and Ray [6]]: under certainty the condition for interim Pareto subopti-
mality in Proposition 1 reduces to
∞∑
t=1
∏t
s=1 rs < ∞. This condition is equiv-
alent to the deterministic Cass criterion for dynamic inefficiency. However,
under uncertainty dynamic efficiency is a strictly weaker efficiency bench-
mark [see Bertocchi [3,4] for a discussion]. Comparing conditions (3) and (4),
the condition for dynamic inefficiency is a special case of the one for interim
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Pareto suboptimality for the choice of a transfer pattern starting in σ˜ given by
λ (σ′) := p(σ
′)
p(σ)
·f ′ (k (σ) , θ) for σ′ = (σ, θ) ∈ Γ (σ˜) . Curing dynamic inefficiency
focuses attention on a particular form of improvement: transfers with payoffs
f ′ in each state.
Arbitrary Returns and Pareto Optimality More generally, consider an
arbitrary (portfolio of) asset(s) with given return R (σ) , σ ∈ Γ. In a competi-
tive equilibrium, by no-arbitrage, this return has to satisfy the Euler equation:
∑
σ′∈σ+
p (σ′)
p (σ)
·R (σ′) = 1 for each σ ∈ Γ. (5)
We will call each function R : Γ→ R such that (5) holds a return. Since mar-
kets are sequentially complete, each return corresponds to the rate of return
of an asset that could be generated from a given set of assets that span the
market space. A particular return is given by the marginal product of capi-
tal f ′, the risky rate of return, which satisfies (5) in an interior competitive
equilibrium from the profit maximization condition of the firm.
Endow the shock space S with the discrete topology and endow the space∏∞
t=0 St with St = S for each t ≥ 1, with the corresponding product topology.
Since we can identify each path σ∞ with a sequence of shocks (θ0, θ1, θ2, ...) ,
this defines a topology on the set of all paths of the date-event tree Γ. For a
given transfer pattern λ, let Γλ := {σ ∈ Γ |λ (σ) > 0}. Note that our definition
of a transfer pattern implies that Γλ is a subtree. We identify Γλ with the paths
it contains. We have for a general class of returns:
Proposition 3 Consider an interior competitive equilibrium allocation which
is interim suboptimal. Then for any transfer pattern λ that satisfies the sub-
optimality condition (3) and any return R (σ) ≥ 0, σ ∈ Γ, such that for each
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σ ∈ Γλ there is some σ′ ∈ σ+ ∩ Γλ with R (σ′) > 0, we have:
(a) The set of paths σ∞ in Γλ with
∑∞
t=1
∏t
s=1R (σ
∞
s ) <∞ is nonempty.
(b) If Γλ contains an infinite number of paths, the set of paths σ
∞ in Γλ with∑∞
t=1
∏t
s=1R (σ
∞
s ) <∞ is not finite.
(c) For every node σt ∈ Γλ we have σt = σ∞t for some σ∞ with∑∞
t=1
∏t
s=1R (σ
∞
s ) <∞.
(d) The set paths σ∞ with
∑∞
t=1
∏t
s=1R (σ
∞
s ) <∞ is dense in Γλ (with respect
to the relative topology induced by the product topology on the set of all paths
Γ).
(c) states that paths with
∑∞
t=1
∏t
s=1R (σ
∞
s ) <∞ are spread out ”uniformly”
across the subtree on which the improving transfers exist. (d) restates (c) in
the language of point set topology.
The following proposition yields tests for optimality and suboptimality.
Proposition 4 (a) If at an interior competitive equilibrium allocation there
is a nonnegative return R (i.e. R (σ) ≥ 0 for all σ ∈ Γ) such that for all
paths σ∞ in Σ we have
∑∞
t=1
∏t
s=1R (σ
∞
s ) = ∞, then it is interim Pareto
optimal.
(b) If at an interior competitive equilibrium allocation for some return R and
some node σ˜ ∈ Γ we have that along every path σ∞ in Γ (σ˜) ,∑∞
t=t(σ˜)+1
∏t
s=t(σ˜)+1R
+ (σ∞s ) ≤ M for some M > 0, then it is interim
Pareto suboptimal. Here, R+ (σ) := max {R (σ) , 0} .
Proposition 4 (a) is just the logical contraposition to Proposition 3 (a). An-
other somewhat surprising implication of Proposition 4 (a) is that that all
competitive equilibrium allocations whose state prices are consistent with the
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return (i.e. for which (5) holds), are interim Pareto optimal once we have
found a return R for which
∑∞
t=1
∏t
s=1R (σ
∞
s ) =∞ for all paths σ∞.
First, we consider general assets with nonnegative returns while Chattopad-
hyay [8] considers only a restricted class of long-lived assets. Second, our test
may yield an optimality conclusion when Chattopadhyay’s test is inconclusive,
but not vice versa. 9
In comparison to our Proposition 4 (b), Theorem 2 of Chattopadhyay [8]
assumes an additional bound for
∏t
s=t(σ˜)+1R (σ
∞
s ) for the case of negative
returns (see condition (b) of Theorem 2 in Chattopadhyay [8]). This assump-
tion is, however, not needed to conclude for suboptimality under sequentially
complete markets which is ours and Chattopadhyay’s [8] market structure.
It is possible to construct examples where
∑∞
t=1
∏t
s=1 f
′
(
k
(
σ∞s−1
)
, θ
)
diverges
almost surely, 10 but where the competitive equilibrium is nevertheless Pareto
suboptimal: 11
9 Chattopadhyay considers whether
∑∞
t=1 rt diverges, where rt ≤ q∗ (σ∞0 ) ·
inf
(σ∞1 ,...,σ∞t )∈×ts=1Σs
∏t
s=1R (σ
∞
s ) , where R is the return of the corresponding (port-
folio of) long-lived asset(s) and q∗ (σ∞0 ) its period zero price. Clearly, if
∑∞
t=1 rt
diverges, we also have
∑∞
t=1
∏t
s=1R (σ
∞
s ) = ∞ for every path. But the converse
need not hold, i.e. our test may indicate Pareto optimality while his test remains
inconclusive.
10Almost surely refers to the unique probability measure on the set of paths Σ that,
by the Kolmogorov extension theorem, is generated from the transition probabilities
qt+1 (θt+1 |σ ) for all t ≥ 0 and the ”initial” probability q (σ0) = 1.
11 See the discussion paper version of the paper or a technical appendix available
upon request. Proposition 3 (d) states that in a Pareto suboptimal competitive
equilibrium allocation the set of paths where this sum converges is dense. Both
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Remark 2 For any given asset return, the divergence requirement in Proposi-
tion 4 (a) cannot be weakened to require divergence of the sum ”almost surely”
instead of ”on every path” if one wants to ensure interim Pareto optimality of
a competitive equilibrium.
Appendix
A Proofs
Preliminary Results
We will make use of the so-called Gaussian curvature conditions on utility
functions. In our set-up, these conditions can be shown to hold under our
primitive assumptions on utility functions and the interiority assumptions on
competitive equilibria. A proof is available upon request.
We only state the non-vanishing Gaussian curvature condition. The bounded
Gaussian curvature condition is omitted. It is needed to show that the con-
dition stated in the characterization implies the existence of Pareto improve-
ments. Preferences are given by
Uσ (c (σ)) = Eσ u (c (σ)) =
∑
θt+1∈S qt+1 (θt+1|σ) · u (cy (σ) , co ((σ, θt+1))) .
• non-vanishing Gaussian curvature: there exists a ρ> 0 and a δ > 0,
such that for any interior competitive equilibrium (c∗, k∗, p) , for all feasible
allocations
(
ĉ, k̂
)
∈ K ′, where K ′ is a convex, compact set (in the product
statements are consistent. Together they just say that denseness of the set of con-
vergent paths does not even imply convergence on a set of positive measure.
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topology defined on
∏
σ∈ΓR3+) that contains the set of competitive alloca-
tions, ∀σ ∈ Γ,
Uσ (ĉ (σ)) ≥ Uσ (c (σ)) =⇒
∑
σ′∈σ+
δ2 (σ
′, σ) ≥ −δ1 (σ) + ρ(δ1 (σ))
2
p (σ)
where δ1 (σ) = p (σ)·[ĉy (σ)− c∗y (σ)] and δ2 (σ′, σ) = p (σ′) · [ĉo (σ′)− c∗o (σ′)]
for σ′ ∈ σ+. ρ is called the lower curvature coefficient.
Proposition 1
Proof. If condition (3) in the proposition holds it is straightforward from
Chattopadhyay and Gottardi [9], Theorem 2, that the allocation is not interim
Pareto optimal. It therefore remains to be shown that the existence of an
allocation that improves upon a competitive allocation implies the condition
in the characterization. Our proof highlights and isolates the new steps in
comparison to the pure exchange setup.
Suppose an allocation (ĉ, k̂) improving upon the competitive allocation (c∗, k∗)
exists. Since the economy is bounded above and strictly convex, it can be
shown that we can assume that the deviating allocation (ĉ, k̂) lies in the com-
pact set K ′ defined above. That this is possible follows from the way K ′ is
constructed in the derivation of the non-vanishing Gaussian curvature condi-
tion. This construction is straightforward and available upon request. By the
non-vanishing Gaussian curvature condition we have, for any node σ:
∑
σ′∈σ+
p (σ′)·[ĉo (σ′)− c∗o (σ′)] ≥ −p (σ)·[ĉy (σ)− c∗y (σ)]+ρ·p (σ)·(ĉy (σ)− c∗y (σ))2 .
(A.1)
Define ∆f (σ′) := f
(
k̂ (σ) , θ
)
− f (k∗ (σ) , θ) , ∆k (σ) := k̂ (σ) − k∗ (σ) and
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∆cy (σ) := ĉy (σ) − c∗y (σ). Further, define ∆t (σ) := − (ĉy (σ)− c∗y (σ)) −(
k̂ (σ)− k∗ (σ)
)
. Thus ∆t (σ) is the combined change in young age consump-
tion and in saving. ∆t˜ (σ′) := ĉo (σ′)− c∗o (σ′)− ∆f (σ′) denotes the change in
old age consumption and production at node σ′. Using this we get from (A.1):
∑
σ′∈σ+
p (σ′)·
(
∆f (σ′) + ∆t˜ (σ′)
)
≥ p (σ)·(∆k (σ) + ∆t (σ))+ρ·p (σ)·(∆cy (σ))2 .
Note that by a Taylor expansion f
(
k̂ (σ) , θ
)
− f (k∗ (σ) , θ) = f ′ (k∗ (σ) , θ) ·[
k̂ (σ)− k∗ (σ)
]
+ 1
2
·f ′′ (ζ, θ)·
(
k̂ (σ)− k∗ (σ)
)2
for some ζ(σ) ∈
(
k̂ (σ) , k∗ (σ)
)
.
By assumption, k̂ (σ) and k∗ (σ) are from a compact set (being the coordinate-
wise projection of the compact setK ′) and therefore there exists some constant
c > 0 such that
f
(
k̂ (σ) , θ
)
−f (k∗ (σ) , θ) ≤ f ′ (k∗ (σ) , θ)·
[
k̂ (σ)− k∗ (σ)
]
−1
2
·c·
(
k̂ (σ)− k∗ (σ)
)2
.
Thus ∑
σ′∈σ+
p (σ′) ·∆t˜ (σ′) + ∑
σ′∈σ+
p (σ′) · f ′ (k∗ (σ) , θ) ·∆k (σ) (A.2)
≥ p (σ) · (∆k (σ) + ∆t (σ))+ρ ·p (σ) · (∆cy (σ))2+ 1
2
· ∑
σ′∈σ+
p (σ′) · c · (∆k (σ))2 .
Using the first order condition from profit maximization
∑
σ′∈σ+
p (σ′)·f ′ (k∗ (σ) , θ) =
p (σ) , and that f ′ (k∗ (σ) , θ) ≤ ν by the interiority of the allocation for some
ν > 0, we obtain:
∑
σ′∈σ+
p (σ′)·∆t˜ (σ′) ≥ p (σ)·(∆t (σ))+ρ·p (σ)·(∆cy (σ))2+1
2
·c· p (σ)
ν
(∆k (σ))2 .
Note that (∆cy (σ))2 + (∆k (σ))2 ≥ 1
2
· (∆cy (σ) + ∆k (σ))2 . Defining γ :=
1
2
·min
{
ρ, c
2ν
}
, we thus have
∑
σ′∈σ+
p (σ′) ·∆t˜ (σ′) ≥ p (σ) · (∆t (σ)) + γ · p (σ) · (∆t (σ))2 (A.3)
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Note that from the resource constraint:
−∆cy (σ′)−∆k (σ′) = ∆co (σ′)−∆f (k (σ) , θ) , (A.4)
where ∆co (σ′) = ĉo (σ′)− c∗o (σ′) . Thus ∆t (σ) = ∆t˜ (σ) for each node σ, and
we can use the new quadratic estimate (A.3) to obtain:
∑
σ′∈σ+
p (σ′) ·∆t (σ′) ≥ p (σ) · (∆t (σ)) + γ · p (σ) · (∆t (σ))2 . (A.5)
Since the allocation
(
ĉ, k̂
)
Pareto improves upon (c∗, k∗) , there must exist
some node σ∗ with ∆t (σ∗) > 0. From here on one can follow the arguments in
the proof of Theorem 1, pp. 53 in Chattopadhyay and Gottardi [9] to complete
the proof.
Proposition 3
Proof. If we define for σ ∈ Γλ and for σ′ = (σ, θ) ∈ Γλ:
µ (σ′) :=
p(σ′)
p(σ)
·R (σ′)∑
σ˜∈Γλ∩σ+
p(σ˜)
p(σ)
·R (σ˜)
we have that µ is well-defined since by assumption R (σ˜) > 0 for some σ˜ ∈
Γλ ∩ σ+. Further ∑σ′∈Γλ∩σ+ µ (σ′) = 1 for all σ ∈ Γλ. Since the µ (σ′) are also
nonnegative, they form a transfer pattern according to Definition 4. For any
transfer pattern λ and for each node σ ∈ Γλ there must exist an σ′ ∈ Γλ ∩ σ+
such that λ (σ′) ≥ µ (σ′) . (If not, ∑σ′∈Γλ∩σ+ λ (σ′) < 1, which contradicts
the definition of a transfer pattern). Starting from the root σ0, we can thus
inductively define a path σ∞ in Γλ such that λ (σ∞t ) ≥ µ (σ∞t ) for all t. Now if
λ is an improving transfer pattern, then on this path we have for some A > 0
A ≥
∞∑
t=1
t∏
s=1
λ (σ∞s ) ·
1
p (σ∞t )
≥
∞∑
t=1
t∏
s=1
µ (σ∞s ) ·
1
p (σ∞t )
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=
∞∑
t=1
t∏
s=1
p(σ∞s )
p(σ∞s−1)
·R (σ∞s )∑
σ˜∈Γλ∩(σ∞s−1)
+
p(σ˜)
p(σ∞s−1)
·R (σ˜)
· 1
p (σ∞t )
=
∞∑
t=1
t∏
s=1
R (σ∞s ) ·
1∑
σ˜∈Γλ∩(σ∞s−1)
+
p(σ˜)
p(σ∞s−1)
·R (σ˜)
≥
∞∑
t=1
t∏
s=1
R (σ∞s )
where the second equality uses the normalization p (σ0) = 1 and the last
inequality uses the fact that
∑
σ˜∈Γλ∩(σ∞s−1)
+
p(σ˜)
p(σ∞s−1)
· R (σ˜) ≤ 1 from (5) and
the nonnegativity of R. This proves the first claim. Since for each σt ∈ Γλ,
the subtree Γλ∩Γ (σt) also allows for an improving transfer pattern, the third
claim follows from repeating the arguments above. The fourth claim follows
immediately from the third claim since the product topology is characterized
by pointwise convergence. Since the number of nodes in Γλ with more than
one successor node is at least countable if the number of paths in Γλ is not
finite, the second claim follows.
Proposition 4
Proof. (a) If the condition
∑∞
t=1
∏t
s=1R (σ
∞
s ) =∞ holds for all paths σ∞, we
have R (σ) > 0 for all σ ∈ Γ and thus the assumptions of Proposition 3 hold.
If an improvement is possible, by Proposition 3, part (a), there exists at least
one path σ∞ on which
∑∞
t=1
∏t
s=1R (σ
∞
s ) <∞. This yields a contradiction.
(b) Since R is a return, we have for each σ ∈ Γ that ∑σ′∈σ+ p(σ′)p(σ) ·R (σ′) = 1.
Hence we have for each σ ∈ Γ that ∑σ′∈σ+ p(σ′)p(σ) · R+ (σ′) ≥ 1. Define µ˜ (σ′) =
p(σ′)
p(σ)
· R+ (σ′) for each σ′ ∈ σ+ with σ ∈ Γ (σ˜) and µ (σ′) = µ˜(σ′)∑
σ̂∈σ+ µ˜(σ̂)
. For
each σ ∈ σ˜− ∪ {σ˜} define µ (σ) = 1 and µ (σ) = 0 for all remaining σ ∈ Γ.
We have 0 ≤ µ (σ′) ≤ µ˜ (σ′) and ∑σ′∈σ+ µ (σ′) = 1 for each σ′ ∈ σ+ with
σ ∈ Γ (σ˜) . Now for each path σ∞ with σ∞
t(σ˜)
= σ˜,
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1p
(
σ∞
t(σ˜)
) · ∞∑
t=t(σ˜)+1
t∏
s=t(σ˜)+1
R+ (σ∞s ) =
∞∑
t=t(σ˜)+1
t∏
s=t(σ˜)+1
p (σ∞s )
p (σ∞s−1)
·R+ (σ∞s ) ·
1
p (σ∞t )
=
∞∑
t=t(σ˜)+1
1
p (σ∞t )
t∏
s=t(σ˜)+1
µ˜ (σ∞s )
≥
∞∑
t=t(σ˜)+1
1
p (σ∞t )
t∏
s=t(σ˜)+1
µ (σ∞s )
Because
∑∞
t=t(σ˜)+1
∏t
s=t(σ˜)+1R
+ (σ∞s ) ≤ M for each path σ∞ with σ∞t(σ˜) = σ˜,
we have that 1
p
(
σ∞
t(σ˜)
) ·∑∞
t=t(σ˜)+1
∏t
s=t(σ˜)+1R
+ (σ∞s ) ≤ M
p
(
σ∞
t(σ˜)
) for all those
paths and thus, from the inequality proved above and the definition of the
transfer pattern µ, we have∑∞
t=1
1
p(σ∞t )
∏t
s=1 µ (σ
∞
s ) ≤ M
p
(
σ∞
t(σ˜)
) + ∑t(σ˜)t=1 1p(σ∞t ) for all paths σ∞ ∈ Σ. It
follows from Proposition 1 for B = M
p
(
σ∞
t(σ˜)
) +∑t(σ˜)t=1 1p(σ∞t ) that the competi-
tive equilibrium is interim Pareto suboptimal.
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